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The Nature and Theoretical Limits of Adjudicative 
Formalism in Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Legal Theory
KRISZTINA FICSOR
Abstract. In this essay, the author attempts to reveal the character and theoretical limits of judicial formalism. 
Formalism is a normative theory of adjudication which means that it provides determined answers to the question 
of how judges should decide legal cases. Judicial formalism is related to the view that legal reasoning is a special 
area of practical reasoning because legal reasoning should rely on reasons and arguments that stem from a limited 
domain of practical reasons: lawyers should justify legal decisions by relying on the reasons that originate in so-
called source-based law. However, one of the tasks of legal theory is to solve the problem of judicial formalism 
which arises during legal practice. It can often occur that the decision, which follows clearly from the source-
based law, is unjust or unfair if we take all relevant factors and the wider context of the case into consideration. 
The theoretical issue is whether judges are allowed to depart from the source-based law and if they are, in what 
type of cases can they do this. This essay tries to throw light on the theoretical conceptions within which the 
problem of formalism can be handled, for example, the theory of the nature of law or virtue jurisprudence.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this essay is to make in-depth inquires into a normative theory of judicial 
decision-making. Theories of judicial decision-making, in other words, theories of 
adjudication, fall into two categories. We can make a distinction between descriptive and 
normative theories (Leiter 2010: 1). Descriptive theories address the question of what 
judges do when they decide cases. The main issue here is what the real reasons, motives, 
psychological and social phenomena are behind the reasoning involved in judicial decisions. 
Sociological or psychological theories are interested in such kind of questions. We can 
mention here the Legal Realist movement’s or Jerome Frank’s ideas about judicial decision-
making as attempts to highlight and describe the real facts behind judicial decisions.  
Normative theories of adjudication try to answer the question of what judges should do 
when they decide cases, and focus on the question of how judges should justify their legal 
decisions. They attempt to reveal and analyse the principles and reasons that can serve as 
proper grounds for legal decisions. This theoretical analysis concentrates on the nature and 
the limits of judicial formalism.
Judicial formalism, on the one hand, is a judicial decision-making model for handling 
cases in a special way. As we shall see later, the term “adjudicative formalism” is used to 
mean that judges – when deciding particular legal cases – choose to apply the so-called 
source-based law and refuse to rely on reasons external to source based law (for example, 
moral principles, principles of equity or justice, the purposes behind legal rules and so on) 
(Schauer 1988–1989; Schauer 2009).
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On the other hand, in this author’s opinion, formalism is a normative theory of 
adjudication which aims at justifying this decision-making model by exploring the 
principles which support formalist adjudication. That is, formalism gives distinctive answers 
to the question of what judges should do when they decide cases (Moore 1980–1981: 154).1 
Thus, my purpose is to analyse the theoretical aspects and limits of judicial formalism.
So, the concept of “formalism” or “legal formalism” will be discussed in this text as it 
appears in adjudication and the term will refer to the so-called “judicial formalism”. As the 
term “legal formalism” can be understood in many ways (Weinrib 1987–1988; Leiter 1999; 
Posner 1986–1987: 181),2 it must be emphasized that I will refer to this concept as a judicial 
strategy of reasoning and a normative theory of adjudication.  
The reason for choosing this subject is that some Hungarian theoretical articles which 
are interested in analysing the practice of Hungarian courts (Bencze 2011; Bencze–Matzak–
Kühn 2010: 81–89) have come to the conclusion that courts in Hungary are mostly engaged 
in formalist adjudicative methods. However, in Hungary, formalism is not considered a 
valuable and useful strategy in adjudication.
It is said that – among others – the main reason for engaging in formalist reasoning is 
the fact that the increasing workload forces judges to apply time-saving and less burdensome 
strategies of applying law. Formalism is thought to be the best strategy for solving cases 
easily within a short time and this sometimes results in unacceptable legal outcomes 
(Bencze–Matzak–Kühn 2010: 82). 
Notwithstanding, formalism is much more than simply a resort to time-saving judicial 
strategies. My point is that it seems that in Hungary formalist judicial decision-making 
strategies are working elements of judicial practice; however, their formalism is not based 
on judges’ commitment to the normative principles behind formalism. Their commitment to 
formalism serves only practical aims (e.g. fi nishing trials in a short time) and due to this 
attitude, they do not feel forced to think over the real content and the wider context of legal 
rules. This formalism manifests itself in understanding the simple meaning of legal rules 
without thinking over the whole context of legal cases. 
However, formalism involves more than making “half-baked” or “unreasoned” 
decisions. Formalism in this fashion can be understood as a judicial strategy to cover the 
real reasons or motivations behind the decisions. As Frederick Schauer asserts, formalism 
can be understood as the “denial of political, moral, social and economic choices involved 
in the decision” (Schauer 1988–1989: 511). Notwithstanding this, my point is that formalist 
judicial strategies are able to manifest a real commitment to the normative principles behind 
formalism (e.g. the principle of the rule of law, the principle of democracy, the authority of 
1 “Formalism is essentially a theory of adjudication. A perennial question of American 
jurisprudence has focused on what a judge does and should do in deciding a case. Any answer to this 
question may be called a theory of adjudication.” (Moore 1980–1981: 154).
2 See, for example, the following “defi nitions” of formalism: “Formalism postulates that law is 
intelligible as an internally coherent phenomenon” (Weinrib 1987–1988). “Whereas positivism is a 
theory of law, formalism is a theory of adjudication, a theory about how judges actually do decide 
cases and/or a theory about how they ought to decide them.” (Leiter 1999: 1144). “I want it (formalism 
– K. F.) to mean the use of deductive logic to derive the outcome of a case from premises accepted as 
authoritative. Formalism enables a commentator to pronounce the outcome of the case as being 
correct or incorrect, in approximately the same way that the solution to a mathematical problem can 
be pronounced correct or incorrect” (Posner 1986–1987: 181).
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law, the separation of powers, etc.). That is why a formalist decision can be the result of a 
careful consideration of the reasons behind the decision.
Thus, it is important to make clear what adjudicative formalism is, because this has 
been one of the most frequently criticized viewpoints in legal theory. The term “formalism” 
has usually been used in a pejorative sense. For example, we can think about the Legal 
Realist tradition in which formalism featured as the most unwelcome method of legal 
reasoning. However, formalism can be a valuable and a necessary part of legal reasoning, 
but it has its limits. So, an in-depth examination of the character of legal formalism enables 
us to judge whether it is an acceptable strategy in adjudication, and whether it is an adequate 
theory of judicial reasoning.
Because formalism is not merely about a blindfold adherence to rigid and thoughtless 
mechanical interpretative strategies, this essay will try to reveal and set out the most 
important theoretical approaches that are needed to be explained if we want to understand 
formalism. A normative theory of adjudication, when it makes clear its main considerations 
about the correct method of reasoning and interpretation, should not ignore the special 
character of law and legal reasoning. Thus, on the one hand, the theory of formalism should 
involve in its analysis that law claims legitimate authority. On the other hand, it should pay 
attention to the special character of legal institutions that are responsible for justifying their 
decisions and interpreting law. So, formalism as a normative theory of adjudication should 
take into consideration the function of adjudication and the special personal virtues and 
features of judges. Thus, the second part of the essay will try to fi nd the connection between 
legal formalism and the theory of law, law’s claim to authority, the theories about the 
function of adjudication and virtue jurisprudence. 
II. THE CHARACTER OF LEGAL (JUDICIAL) FORMALISM
Let me start my analysis with the considerations of a formalist legal theorist, Robert S. 
Summers. According to Summers, formality is the fundamental character of law. By the 
“formal feature” of law he means that it is in various ways independent from the substantive 
content of law. Every basic legal phenomenon is formal in some important way. (The formal 
character of law manifests itself in fi xed legal rules, legislative procedures, judicial 
interpretation and so on.) If we do not understand the important role of “form” in law we 
will not understand an important element of the nature of law (Summers 1992a). 
These considerations throw light on an important feature of law, namely its formality. It 
is indeed the case that law usually manifests itself in formal and fi xed rules, lawyers solve 
legal cases and apply norms within the framework of formal procedures. Formal rules regulate 
the ways and methods used to create law, citizens rely on fi xed legal rules as reasons for their 
actions, and so on. It seems, that in modern democratic legal systems, fi xed legal rules play a 
very important role in solving legal problems (Schauer 1991: 651–657; Bódig 2004).3 
3 However, I would not argue that the thesis regarding the formal character of law must be a 
conceptual claim about the nature of law. Rather, it is an empirical claim: it means that law in most 
modern societies manifests itself in formal phenomena, e.g. fi xed legal rules, but it does not mean that 
this could not be otherwise. As Frederick Schauer asserts, it is possible to qualify a system – which 
does not contain, or whose decision-makers do not rely on fi xed rules – as a legal system (Schauer 
1991: 651–657). Thus, in this essay, I will take formality, and formal legal rules as an important 
feature of modern legal systems, but in the background of this claim I will accept the thesis that legal 
rules are not conceptual elements of law. The relation between rules and the law is contingent (Bódig 
2004).
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Our task here will be to make clear the issue of what role the formal elements of law 
should play in judicial reasoning. The reason for analysing this question is that formalists 
usually insist on the claim that fi xed legal materials must determine legal decisions. This is 
a normative claim, and our aim is to examine the adequacy of this thesis. To what extent 
should fi xed legal norms determine legal decisions? Are there any situations when legal 
norms cannot serve as the basis of legal decisions? 
As it was mentioned above, a specifi c kind of formalism is in the centre of this 
analysis, which we can call judicial formalism. In contemporary legal theory Frederick 
Schauer and Larry Alexander are the most prominent defenders of legal formalism of the 
sort that I will concentrate on. In their view, formalism is related to so-called rule-based 
decision-making and reasoning. Following Frank Michelman we can refer to this particular 
type of formalism as “rule-formalism” (Michelman 1999).
II/a) Features of rule-formalism
The central claim of this idea is that in law, lawyers must justify their conclusions with 
reasons stemming from the limited domain of law (source-based law) and judges are forced 
to restrict the scope of considerations that can fi gure in the decision-making process to the 
relevant legal reasons (e.g. to fi xed legal rules). “By examining the possibility that law is a 
limited domain, I consider the proposition that there are in most advanced legal systems a 
substantial quantity of otherwise valid social norms, or otherwise valid sources of decision, 
that law refuses to accept. If law is a limited decisional domain, arguments permissible in 
other and larger domains become impermissible in law.” (Schauer 2004: 1914–1915.)
It seems that the result of this thesis in adjudication can be that judges should refuse to 
base their decisions on moral, political or other extra-legal considerations, even if their 
conclusions based on the source-based law may seem to be – all things considered – unjust, 
or immoral (Schauer 2004: 1915, 1953).4 Formalists (Larry Alexander or Frederick 
Schauer), in other words, would say that formalism is about adherence to the legal norm’s 
prescription “without regard to the background reasons the norm is meant to serve” 
(Alexander 1999: 531).5 
The main feature of this conception is that taking into consideration the fact that 
sometimes it occurs that insisting on the application of source-based law (e.g. fi xed legal 
4 It must be emphasized that I take the limited domain thesis as a normative thesis about law. In 
Schauer’s conception it is rather an empirical thesis. “The limited domain claim is both empirical and 
a matter of degree. Law may be more or less a limited domain, and the interest lies in the ‘more’ or 
the ‘less.’” (Schauer 2004: 1915.) However, I think that the limited domain thesis imposes a normative 
burden on adjudication. If the law is a limited domain of reasons, then judges’ decisions must be 
based on those reasons that stem from this limited area. Schauer also throws light on the normative 
aspect of the limited domain thesis. Even the concept held by those legal positivist authors, who 
established a conceptual theory of law (e.g. Bentham) also involves a normative commitment. They 
did not just believe that law should be conceptually isolated from other normative fi elds of discourse, 
but they insisted on the requirement that judges’ decisions must rely on reasons from this limited 
domain (Schauer 2004: 1953).
5 However, a very important problem is raised by the issue of “source-based law” and “rule-
based decision-making”. It is not obvious that source-based law is identical to fi xed legal rules. 
However, it seems that the kind of formalism that I focus on takes legal rules as the relevant elements 
of source-based law. In my opinion this is the reason the problem of formalism includes the question 
of what law is. But this question will not be analysed in this essay in detail.  
42 KRISZTINA FICSOR
rules) does not serve the background reasons and purposes of the rule in a particular case. 
“Rules may point to results that diverge from those that a decision-maker would have 
reached apart from the literal meaning of the rule.” (Schauer 1987–1988: 530.) If this is the 
case, a formalist judge is unresponsive to the substantive ends of the rule and indifferent to 
other reasons than the text of the rule (such as moral reasons). Formalism is about the idea 
that law is a distinctive area of practical deliberation which excludes some considerations 
which “would otherwise be relevant to the situation” (Bódig 2008: 9).6
II/b) Formalism and the problem of interpretation
A further question needs clarifi cation. Applying fi xed legal norms cannot be realized 
without interpretation of these norms. Interpretation of legal materials is the most important 
element of adjudication. Legal reasoning is interpretive in the sense that legal practitioners 
extract the reasons, which can function as the legitimate basis of their decisions, from legal 
materials by interpreting those materials (Bódig 2006: 35). Thus, an essential part of our 
analysis is to answer the question of what formalists think about the issues of interpretation: 
how is it possible for a judge to insist on applying the fi xed legal materials? 
It seems, formalists have not developed a common conception of the issues of 
interpretation. Some of them (for example Frederick Schauer) support the thesis of semantic 
autonomy. This means that what makes it possible for a judge to apply legal rules without 
relying on extra-legal considerations, is the fact that words and sentences are able to have 
acontextual meaning. The fact that we have “linguistic competence” in speaking a language 
provides us with the opportunity of understanding words and sentences without knowing 
the wider contexts of these words or sentences or the background intentions and aims 
behind them (Schauer 1987–1988: 526–528). It seems the result of this consideration is that 
revealing the plain meaning of rules can play a central role in supporting legal decisions. Or 
in other words, the nature of language ensures the opportunity for the judge to apply legal 
rules without relying on the background reasons, justifi cations and wider context of the 
rule. 
However, according to Schauer, it must be clear that this is not a normative claim. This 
is rather an empirical claim: it is possible for judges to refuse to rely on considerations 
other than fi xed legal rules because the language of rules (the plain meaning of rules) can 
often be certain enough to determine legal decisions. However, judges are able (e.g. in a 
psychological sense) to ignore the relatively clear meaning of rules and it is possible that 
they base their conclusions on extra-legal reasons, for example, on reasons stemming from 
equity, or justice and so on. There is a choice for judges in adjudication, and it is true that 
either the choice of relying on the plain meaning of rules or ignoring the application of 
rules can be found in the judicial practices of modern legal systems. We cannot say which 
judicial “strategy” prevails over the other (Schauer 2009: 29).
In Hungary László Blutman defends textual interpretation by deploying many 
arguments supporting this kind of interpretative strategy. By textual interpretation he means 
the judges’ efforts to fi gure out the plain or ordinary meaning of words and sentences 
(Blutman 2010: 95). Finding out the plain meaning of legal concepts is important because 
this is the only interpretative strategy that makes possible intelligible and predictable 
communication and reasoning about legal issues among legal professionals. Plain meaning 
6 Bódig, M.: Rules, Principles, and the Problem of the Limits of Legal Reasoning. Electronic 
copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1318638. p. 9. 
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is the relatively objective ground of legal reasoning which makes legal decisions more 
predictable. Ignoring the clear meaning of legal texts – engaging in moral reasoning for 
example – entails the possibility of relying on subjective preferences or establishing an 
incoherent and inconsistent legal practice (Blutman 2010: 97–99).
In fact, defending the value of predictability, stability and certainty in law and in legal 
reasoning is consistent with formalism. Insisting on textual interpretation can be a good 
instrument for formalists to guarantee the requirement to isolate legal reasoning from 
political and moral reasoning, and by virtue of this, provide a predictable, stable practice of 
reasoning and decision-making. Plain or ordinary meaning can be taken by them as the 
objective ground of legal reasoning which cannot be related to moral or political issues.7 
However, others would say that “interpretation in law and in life is a search for 
speaker’s meaning.” (Alexander–Sherwin 2008: 133). This means that judges, when they 
interpret a statute, should seek and reveal the intentions of the legislators; in other words, 
judges should fi gure out what the legislators wanted to communicate by creating the 
particular rule. The reason for this is that the “plain meaning” of words and sentences is 
always determined by the speakers’ intentions. The grammatical meaning of words and 
sentences are only the “reports of the speaker’s meaning” (Alexander–Sherwin 2008: 134). 
That is why meaning can never be isolated from the intentions of the speaker and the 
context of the text’s creation. Meaning is always communicated by intentions (Alexander–
Sherwin 2008: 135). The result of this is that a judge, as a formalist decision-maker, only 
decides according to fi xed legal norms (source-based law) if she understands legislative 
intentions (Solum 2010: 95–108; 95–98).8
II/c) The central arguments of my analysis
Without committing myself either to the fi rst or the second interpretation I state my case 
here in advance. 
1. At the centre of my theoretical attention will be those cases in which the meaning of 
legal rules are relatively clear and judges are able to give relatively clear answers to the 
question before them by simply relying on the plain meaning of the rule. These cases can be 
called “easy cases”.
2. However, I think it can happen that these kinds of clear cases become hard when the 
decision derived from the plain meaning of the rule is irrational, unjust, or inconsistent with 
the principles of equity or political morality. Formalism means – as I stated above – that in 
such cases judges should ignore reasons other than the clear meaning of the rule. 
7 However, it is a matter of an analysis of the nature of language whether this thesis is correct.
8 Regarding the questions of interpretation, it can be a very useful analysis from the point of 
view of formalism, if we take into consideration the distinction between interpretation and 
construction. See Solum 2010: 95–108. The distinction refers to the difference between interpreting a 
text and the activity of construction. According to L. B. Solum, applying a legal text to a particular 
case involves two stages. The fi rst is interpretation, which is aimed at discovering or recognizing the 
linguistic meaning of the text and nothing more. Construction is the second element of applying a 
legal text, which gives legal effect or legal content to the text by translating it into a legal doctrine 
(Solum 2010: 95–98). The latter is not part of the “simple” or “plain” linguistic or semantic content of 
the text. The interesting question for formalism is whether it is justifi ed to “overrule” the clear text of 
the legal rule by construction or when it is justifi ed to engage in “constructive” application of law by 
ignoring the clear meaning of the statute. 
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3. This kind of formalism is a valuable judicial “attitude”, and plays a central role in 
law. There are cases when judges engage in an “intelligent” or justifi able formalism. In this 
case, the formalist decision is the result of a careful consideration of the reasons for making 
a formalist decision in the particular case. However, I will argue for the claim that there is 
an unintelligent or unjustifi able kind of formalism, too. The latter means that the judge 
insists on revealing the plain meaning of the rule while the correct solution of the case 
demands that other kind of reasons (for example moral principles, the requirements of 
equity, justice) should be balanced. The reason for the impropriety of this formalism is that 
the particular case cannot be solved in the right way by resorting only to the text of the 
most applicable legal rule. There are cases when formalist judicial behaviour, that is, having 
resort to the rule cannot be an adequate basis for reaching the right legal answer.
4. My point is that the problem of formalism – that is, the issue of when formalism is 
justifi able and when it is not – is a theoretical issue. I mean by this that this question cannot 
and should not be answered in a case by case analysis: the judge should not decide this 
question according to the circumstances of the cases before him. This entails that the 
borderline between easy cases and hard cases is not clear. Even if it is clear and certain 
what a legal rule requires in a concrete case, it is not enough to treat it as an easy case. 
There is almost always the possibility that an easy case will become a hard case if the 
relatively clear meaning of the rule does not lead to a just, fair or – taking every relevant 
feature of the case into consideration – right decision. Formalism concerns the question of 
what judges have to do when faced with this kind of decisional situation.
5. Thus, the main question of this essay is whether there is a theory of legal reasoning 
which is able to account for the necessity of formalism in legal reasoning and at the same 
time is able to explain that there are cases where formalism is not the right strategy. What 
are the limits of formalism? Are we able to answer this question within the framework of an 
adequate theory of legal reasoning? Further theoretical analysis will show that this is not 
possible. The analysis should go beyond a theory of legal reasoning. 
First, let me consider two examples from Hungarian judicial practice. One of them will 
be an example of justifi able formalism and the other will be an instantiation of an 
unjustifi able formalism. 
III. JUDICIAL DECISIONS FROM HUNGARIAN LEGAL PRACTICE
III/a) Decision of the Court of Budapest: Nr. 4. P.III.25.549/2006/47 
A testator in his last will left his possessions to an association established by the testator 
some years before. The testament consisted of two pages and only on the second page was 
a page number. The legal heirs sued the association and they claimed that the testament was 
not valid because it did not meet the requirements of the rules of law. According to section 
629 (2) of the Hungarian Civil Code a will that contains more than one page is valid only if 
each and every page is numbered. [629 (2) A holographic will consisting of several separate 
pages shall be deemed valid only if each page is numbered in sequence and signed by the 
testator and, if witnesses are needed for the validity of the will, also signed by both 
witnesses.]
The respondent’s main argument was that formalism is not the right strategy in 
deciding testamentary cases; instead of this, courts must decide in favour of the testator’s 
will. This particular testament absolutely refl ected the testator’s will, moreover – except for 
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the page numbers – all the other elements met the requirements of the rules of the Civil 
Code. Thus, the court should not prefer the plain meaning of the rule to the testator’s will.  
The court concluded that the clear meaning of legal rules cannot be ignored by 
referring to the incorrectness of formalism. The Civil Code clearly determines the formal 
requisites of a valid testament; thus, the court should not turn from the plain meaning of the 
rule. Even if there is only one formal defect which – all things considered – seems 
insignifi cant, the testament is invalid.
This decision can be conceived of as a carefully considered commitment to formalism: 
it took the formal requisites determined by the rule as a guarantee whose purpose is to 
prevent others from changing the pages and the content of the testament arbitrarily. 
However, not every judicial decision is an example of an intelligent formalism. Many 
decisions refl ect the unwelcome type of formalist attitude. 
III/b) Decision of the Court of Budapest: Nr. 41. Pt. 640 715/2070/3
In the following case the plaintiff was a journalist who sued a consortium called MH-2009 
Consortium. The factual basis of the case was connected to the renovation works on Margit 
Bridge in Budapest and to the fact that the data concerning the fi nancial implementation of 
these renovation works were unavailable to the public. The plaintiff referred to his right to 
know the fi nancial management data for the renovation works as these data were, in his 
opinion, public information subject to disclosure. The Consortium and the local government 
of the capital city refused to provide the fi nancial statement arguing that this information 
constituted a trade secret. So the plaintiff asked the court to require the respondent to 
publish the Consortium’s fi nancial statement. 
The arguments of the plaintiff were the following: Margit Bridge is in the possession 
of Budapest City Council, the capital city is responsible for renovating the bridge which is a 
public responsibility. In consequence, all data which can be connected to the maintainance 
works are public information and every citizen has the right to know them. Since the local 
authority does not have the adequate professional skills and technical facilities to implement 
the renovation project, it entered into a contract with the Consortium and they agreed on the 
conditions of the renovation work. According to this contract, the Consortium worked on 
the renovation of the bridge and all the costs were covered by the state and the local 
government of Budapest. It follows – the plaintiff claimed – that even if the Consortium is 
a private fi rm, it has public responsibilities, it manages public properties and spends public 
money; therefore, the data concerning this project are of public interest and they must be 
published. 
The Civil Code of Hungary only stipulates that public duties are carried out by state 
institutions or local authorities. However, the plaintiff claimed that the concept of public 
duty is broader than what is determined by the legal rules. There must be a principle or a 
background meaning behind the rules which stipulates that the essential element of this 
concept is that if the duty serves public interests and public aims and is fi nanced by public 
resources, then the fi nancial data connected to its performance are open to disclosure.  
The conclusion of the court was the following. The court emphasized that access to 
data of public interest is a constitutional right of every citizen. However, there are conditions 
attached to accessing the data: the data must be of public interest and they must be handled 
or processed by a state institution or a local government.
The relevant legal rule which had to be applied by the court was section 19 (1) of Act 
of LXIII of 1992 on the Protection of Personal Data and the Disclosure of Information of 
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Public Interest. According to this section the state or local public authorities and agencies 
and other bodies attending to public duties specifi ed by law shall provide the general public 
with accurate information and in good time concerning the matters under their competence, 
such as central government and local government budgets and the implementation thereof, 
the management of assets controlled by the central government and by local authorities, the 
appropriation of public funds, and special and exclusive rights conferred upon market 
actors, private organizations or individuals.
However, the court concluded that the respondent, i.e. the Consortium, is not a state 
institution and neither the state nor the local authority of Budapest has a market share in 
this fi rm. It is a private fi rm. The fact that a local government enters into a contract with a 
private fi rm does not entail that the private fi rm takes over the performance of the public 
duty from the local government. The private fi rm’s services cannot be related to the 
performance of a public duty, only to the extent that the costs were covered by the state and 
the local authority’s budget. The court referred to other sections of this statute, but it insisted 
on the plain meaning of these sections and stipulated that the services provided by the 
Consortium were not mandated by law or any contract; it was not a state or a local 
governmental institution.
The conclusion is that the Consortium has no obligation to provide the public with 
information on the fi nancial management of the renovation works. The Highest Court of 
Hungary (Kúria) confi rmed every element of the argumentation of this decision. 
The implications of the court’s formalism are unacceptable. The court adhered to the 
text of the rules and refused to analyse the policies behind them. The principle mentioned 
by the plaintiff was later incorporated into The Fundamental Law of Hungary: Article 39 
(2) Every organisation managing public funds shall be obliged to account for its management 
of public funds to the general public. Public funds and national assets shall be managed 
according to the principles of transparency and the elimination of corruption. Data relating 
to public funds and national assets shall be data of public interest.
If this principle had been taken seriously the court could have departed from the strict 
meaning of the rules, and could have had the opportunity to oblige a private fi rm to provide 
the fi nancial statements, since the relevant conceptual element of public duty is not the type 
of the performing institution involved but the fact that it manages public funds.
IV. THE THEORETICAL LIMITS OF LEGAL FORMALISM 
It should be emphasized that formalism is a valuable judicial attitude; however, it is not 
valuable for its own sake. As I stated above, formalism has its limits. There are cases when 
it is not enough to rely on the relatively clear meaning of fi xed legal rules. That is why, in 
my opinion, it is worth searching for a theoretical basis by virtue of which we are able to 
decide when the formalist attitude of judges is justifi able and when it is not. The main 
question here is what the theoretical difference is between two cases when one of them is 
an example of justifi able formalism and the other is not. There are some theoretical 
approaches to adjudication that offer some answers to this question. My aim here is to make 
clear that the limits of formalism cannot be fi xed on the basis of a case by case analysis. 
What I mean here is that the limits of formalism are a matter of theory and it is not 
determined by the particular features of legal cases. Let me give a short analysis of those 
theoretical considerations within which the problem of formalism can be handled.
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IV/a) Presumptive formalism 
The fi rst theoretical approach which is able to provide the answer to our question is the 
theory of Frederick Schauer. An important feature of his idea is that it is not the case that 
formalism is always good, or that judges should always be formalists. His idea is called 
“presumptive formalism” which means that there should in every case be a presumption in 
favour of the outcome based on the “most locally applicable rule”, which is the rule or a 
statute “which most narrowly pertains to the situation at hand” (Schauer 1987–1988: 517). 
However, if there are compelling reasons against the text of the legal rule, then judges can 
turn from the literal meaning of the law. However, formalism has priority over non-formalist 
attitudes. 
The normative principle which is used to justify this kind of decision-making method 
is the principle of the separation of powers. In short, it is about the idea that judges are not 
authorized to depart from the written text of the legal rules – it is for the legislator to decide 
moral or political questions. According to this idea, formalism is about power (Schauer 
1987–1988: 543). This means that a formalist decision-maker is committed to the view that, 
no matter how compelling the circumstances which urge him to depart from the text of the 
rule, he is not empowered to decide against what the law says. As Schauer says: “Part of 
what formalism is about is its inculcation of the view that sometimes it is appropriate for 
decision makers to recognize their lack of jurisdiction and to defer even when they are 
convinced that their own judgement is best.” (Schauer 1987–1988: 509.) According to this 
view, formalism is a valuable adjudicative model in those political systems where it is 
desirable to narrow down the decisional possibilities of certain democratic institutions.
However, according to Schauer, the judgement about when to engage in formalistic 
reasoning is a contextual, psychological or political matter rather than a logical or a 
conceptual question (Schauer 1987–1988: 544). Notwithstanding this, I would like to argue 
for the claim that the problem of formalism should not depend on contextual questions, or 
on the psychological attitudes of the judges – it is a normative question.  The normative 
question of formalism should not be dependent on case by case decisions. Despite this, it 
seems that Schauer differentiates between two types of cases; in one type formalism is an 
acceptable judicial strategy, while in the other it is employed to make a rather non-formalist 
decision. Taking his examples into consideration, two kinds of hard cases can be 
distiguished. One kind covers those cases in which, although the semantic or linguistic 
content of the rule is relatively clear, the decision derived from this clear meaning would 
come into confl ict with the principles of equity if the judge were to pay attention to the 
relevant particular circumstances of the case. It is possible to take Schauer’s “eviction of 
starving people” example as a case falling under this category of hard cases. The eviction of 
starving people by insisting on the clear meaning of the rule is not acceptable. This kind of 
formalism is condemnable (Schauer 1987–1988: 543). Other examples can be mentioned 
from legal history, like the famous decisions made by Magnaud on the basis of equity, 
which are obviously instances of this kind of hard cases.
The essential character of these hard cases is that the special circumstances of the 
plaintiff or the defendant, or the peculiar features of the factual situation require the judge 
to take the principles of equity into consideration and to diverge from the clear meaning of 
the rule.
However, the other type of hard cases is the one in which without balancing the 
principles of political morality, the case cannot be decided in a correct way. In these kind of 
cases, the judge is not “forced” to rely on equity; rather he faces the possibility of 
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interpreting a concept of political morality. For example, solving the case requires that 
judges interpret the concept of liberty, human dignity, responsibility, autonomy or some less 
abstract principles behind the fi xed legal rule. Among Schauer’s examples are cases whose 
solution is connected to the Amendments of the Constitution of the United States. But it is 
possible to refer to Hungarian cases, too, in which trial courts had to balance principles of 
political morality or constitutional rights and it was not just the text of the most applicable 
rule which was taken into consideration (Bencze 2011: 77–109). However, Schauer argues 
for the claim that in this kind of case the judge is required to make modest decisions and to 
refuse to balance all relevant reasons and factors in the case. These cases require judges to 
be formalists (Schauer 1987–1988: 543). 
It seems that the relevant normative principle which can be a guiding line for deciding 
whether a formalist strategy is justifi ed or not, is the separation of powers. According to this 
constitutional principle decisional powers are allocated to different institutions in a 
democratic political community. Judges are not allowed to decide all kinds of questions. 
Their main task is to respect the main elements of source-based law – especially legal rules 
and statutes – and only compelling reasons can justify the “overruling” of the text of the 
most locally applicable rules. In cases where the confl ict between the decisions derived 
from the legal rule and the principles of equity or justice or other non-legal reasons is not 
too obvious or not too strong, there is no justifi cation for ignoring the rule’s clear content. 
Judges have to respect the legal rules’ presumptive force and they are only allowed to turn 
from them when the non-legal reasons are compelling and outweigh the reasons for 
following the rule (Schauer 1991: 676).
Schauer’s answers to the problem of formalism are very convincing. His theory of 
legal reasoning is able to take into account the idea that while formalism has to be an 
important part of judicial reasoning, it does, however, have its limits. Presumptive formalism 
is able to explain that the elements of source-based law have an authoritative or pre-emptive 
force. Rules are not just good advice for citizens and judges on how to act. Moreover, it 
takes into consideration the idea that extreme formalism is not a valuable or acceptable 
strategy of reasoning, so judges should realize when source-based law should be outweighed 
by relevant non-legal reasons. However, we still can see the problem of when and how 
judges can decide whether it is justifi ed to ignore the clear meaning of legal rules and when 
it is necessary to make a formalist decision even if it is in confl ict with the relevant non-
legal reasons. What is the theoretical line between justifi ed and unjustifi ed formalism? Is it 
possible to draw any theoretical lines between these two categories in judicial practice or is 
it really a matter of case by case considerations? What are the theoretical limits of 
formalism?
If we mention the principle of the separation of powers as an answer to the problem of 
formalism, it becomes clear that this issue cannot be answered only within a theory of legal 
reasoning. The separation of powers is a principle of institutional design in a democratic 
political community. Thus, it seems, the theory of legal formalism and the issue of the limits 
of formalism calls for the solution of other questions that are beyond the issue of the theory 
of legal reasoning and interpretation. In my opinion, there are more questions that must be 
discussed to understand the problem of formalism.
The fi rst is the theory of law, and the question of what law is. If we accept that the law 
is a distinctive area of normative discourse, and if judges are bound to apply and rely on 
reasons stemming from this distinctive discourse, then we should say something about the 
boundaries of this normative phenomenon called law. In short, we have to answer the 
question of what law is.
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The second question is the authority of law. Within this analysis we have to make clear 
what kind of obligatory force law has. In short, it must be explicated what kinds of practical 
reasons are provided by law to judges. That is, the question is where the obligation of 
judges to decide according to law stems from. Does source-based law have absolute 
peremptory force or can it be outweighed by other relevant non-legal reasons? What does 
pre-emptive and conclusive force mean in law? 
The third question to be analysed is the function of judges. Here the task is to explain 
what the function of judging is in a political community which is committed to democratic 
or constitutional principles such as the separation of powers. This question can be connected 
to the issue of “institutional design” (Bódig 2008)9 or constitutional structure (Manning 
1999). What kind of decisional power do judges have in a democratic political community? 
What type of issues are they allowed to decide and what are those cases that they should 
refuse to decide? What are the real tasks and functions of a judicial institution?
The answer to all these questions determines the answer to the problem of legal 
formalism. If our aim is to take a stand on the acceptability of formalist legal reasoning and 
interpretation, then we have to take into consideration the above-mentioned issues that are 
prior to the theory of legal reasoning and legal interpretation.
In the following sections I give a short summary of these considerations.  
IV/b) The theory of the nature of law and the theory of adjudication
Given the requirement that the judges are obliged to justify their decisions by relying on 
reasons stemming from a distinctive area of practical reasoning, called law, the problems of 
formalism can, be connected to the wider questions of what law is and of what reasons can 
be taken as parts of the law. This debate concerns the relationship between the theory of the 
nature of law and the theory of legal reasoning or adjudication. This is the debate which 
arose between Joseph Raz and Ronald Dworkin. 
Raz, as a legal positivist, stands for the claim that the task of legal theory is to defi ne 
what law is. Moreover, the defi nition of law must be given without resorting to moral, 
political or other considerations so that law can be identifi ed as a special area of reasoning 
which differs from other normative systems such as morality. The task of legal theory is to 
reveal the law’s distinctive features (Raz 2009: 17). On the contrary, theories of adjudication 
have a different function: they have to explore the character of legal reasoning. They give 
an account of the question of how and why judges rely on extra-legal considerations. The 
aim of the theories of adjudication is to explain that legal reasoning often includes 
arguments that are not parts of the law. 
However, Ronald Dworkin asserts the opposite of this claim. According to him, the 
principles of political morality are part of the law and judges must rely on them when they 
decide cases. This statement means that every legal proposition is valid only if it fi ts into 
the coherent system of the principles of political morality which justifi es the existence and 
the authority of law (Dworkin 2011). It seems that from a Dworkinian point of view, a 
formalist judicial decision is justifi ed only if it has a place in this coherent system of 
principles. “[…] law includes not only the specifi c rules enacted in accordance with the 
community’s accepted practices but also the principles that provide the best moral 
justifi cation for those enacted rules. The law then also includes the rules that follow from 
9 Bódig, M.: Rules, Principles, and the Problem of the Limits of Legal Reasoning. Electronic 
copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1318638
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those justifying principles, even though those further rules were never enacted” (Dworkin 
2011). 
The most important concept that explains this statement is the idea of integrity. The 
value of integrity requires judges to identify legal rights and duties as if they all were 
created by a single author who expresses “a coherent conception of justice and fairness”. 
Propositions of law are true if they incorporate the basic principles of political morality. 
Integrity (the value of coherence) urges judges to assume that law is organized according to 
a coherent set of principles and asks judges to enforce them in new cases (Dworkin 1986). 
This theory can be a relevant candidate for explaining why some formalist decisions 
are jusitifi able and why certain formalist conclusions are not. However, according to some 
critics this theory has to face the problem that it cannot “account for the dual need for 
effi cient authoritative guidance and the openness of law to critical challenges” (Bódig 2008: 
15).10 It seems that we have to face some criticism concerning Dworkin’s theory. The main 
point of these criticism is that there is no place for the view that legal rules (source-based 
law) creates obligations to act and decide according to their prescriptions. In the Dworkinian 
theory there is always an opportunity to ignore legal rules in the light of a principle. 
According to the critic, this theory cannot account for justifi able formalism in legal 
reasoning. 
As we stated above, we are committed to the view that formalism – deciding according 
to the prescriptions of legal rules even if the decision does not meet the requirements of the 
relevant non-legal reasons – must be a part of judicial reasoning. That is why we have to 
take the implications of these criticisms seriously and create a theory about the nature of 
law and its relationship with theories of adjudication. 
IV/c) The authoritative force of source-based law
A further issue that can emerge in the explanation of the problem of formalism is the pre-
emptive force of source-based law, i.e. the authority of law according to the Razian 
conception. The starting point can be the following statement about the nature of law: law 
forms a claim to legitimate authority, which means that authority has a right to provide 
reasons for action in a given decisional situation. “[…] authority is a right to rule, the 
theoretical question is how to understand the standing of an authoritative directive […]. If 
issued by someone who has a right to rule, then its recipients are bound to obey. The 
directive is binding on them and they are duty-bound to obey it.” (Raz 2009: 134.)
In the Razian view the reasons for actions provided by law are authoritative reasons, 
which means that the way they infl uence practical reasoning is special. Reasons are the 
basis for justifying human decisions and behaviours; they guide actions and are also 
relevant in evaluating actions. When an authoritative reason guides behaviour it means that 
it changes the circumstances of justifying actions and decisions. In everyday life we act and 
make decisions by thinking over and pondering the reasons for and against a concrete 
action. In normal circumstances we make a decision or perform an action that is supported 
by the strongest background reasons. However, when an authoritative reason, e.g. the action 
involves a legal rule, then the circumstances in which we ponder the reasons for actions 
change. “Of course, authority is special in the way in which it restricts one’s ability to act 
independently. […] authoritative directives pre-empt those reasons against the conduct they 
10 Bódig, M.: Rules, Principles, and the Problem of the Limits of Legal Reasoning. Electronic 
copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1318638. p. 15.
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require that the authority was meant to take into account in deciding to issue its directives.” 
(Raz 2009: 140.)
Law, as an authoritative reason, pre-empts those reasons that could be relevant in 
supporting the action or decision, even if the decision according to these other reasons 
would be wiser or more rational than the decision according to law. Law – when it applies 
to the case – forms a claim to be the sole reason for action and pre-empts the possibility of 
pondering other non-legal reasons for and against the action. “Those subject to the authority 
are not allowed to second-guess the wisdom or advisability of the authority’s directives.” 
(Raz 2009: 141.)
Another important feature of law as an authoritative reason is that it creates 
exclusionary reasons for action: they are reasons for not following those reasons that result 
in a different decision or action from the one required by law. The pre-emptive force of law 
shows itself as an exclusionary reason. It excludes those reasons from the process of 
balancing of reasons for action that confl ict with the prescription of the law. Even if 
authority makes mistakes, we have an obligation to comply with its prescriptions (Raz 
2009: 144–145.) These considerations can be expressed by the words of Robert Summers, 
when he says that the reasoning under a system called law is formal, which means the 
following: “First of all it is authoritatively formal. It derives from or it is generated by 
legally recognised phenomena – in this case a legal rule. Second, it is mandatorily formal 
[…]. That is, it generally overrides any competing substantive reasoning that may emerge at 
the point of application.” (Summers 1992b.)
From the formalist point of view the following question is relevant among these 
considerations: what sort of obligation is imposed on judges by law as an authoritative 
normative phenomenon? Does this mean that judges are not allowed to consider other 
factors than the reasons stemming from the source-based law? 
The answer can be found in Joseph Raz’s considerations: “Authoritative directives are 
not always conclusive reasons for the conduct they require. They can be defeated by 
confl icting reasons, or by confl icting directives. The reasons that can defeat them are those 
they do not exclude.” (Raz 2009: 145.) 
The theoretical issue that should be answered here is the scope of non-legal reasons 
that must be excluded from legal reasoning and the scope of non-legal reasons that can be 
taken into consideration by judges when they decide cases. What sort of reasons should be 
excluded and what sort of considerations are allowed to defeat authoritative legal reasons?
Joseph Raz gives an answer to this question. According to him, not all confl icting 
reasons are excluded, just those that have already been considered and pondered by the 
lawmaker before it enacted the legal rule. However, is it possible for a judge to fi gure out 
what kind of reasons were taken into considerations by the lawmaker in the parliamentary 
discussion of the rule? Moreover, is it possible to offer a theoretical answer to the question 
of what sort of reasons should be excluded from judicial reasoning when she has to decide 
in a concrete case? Or is this issue only a matter of case by case analysis?
The theoretical question here is that we have to reconcile the fact that the law claims 
legitimate authority and as a result of this, claims pre-emptive and exclusionary force, and 
the fact that in judicial practice it often occurs that judges rely on extra-legal reasons and 
arguments. What are the consequences of this on the pre-emptive and exclusionary force of 
law? What can be the reasons for judges to rely on extra-legal considerations and how is it 
possible to justify these decisions?
My point is that this question is closely connected with the problem of formalism. As 
it was stated above formalism is strongly connected to the view that judges should rely on 
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reasons that stem from a restricted area of practical reasoning. If judges rely on 
considerations that are in confl ict with the source-based law, or reasons that are not 
supported by any legal rules, then whether this can be justifi ed or not should be answered 
theoretically. This is a central question for formalism, which should be made clear.
IV/d) The function of adjudication
However, it is not just the questions of “What is law?” and the pre-emptive force of law 
which can be related to the problem of formalism; another perspective should also be taken 
into account. The problem of formalism can be handled within a broader theoretical 
framework which concentrates on the function of adjudication within an institutional 
structure of a constitutional democracy. According to this idea, “we need theories that try to 
handle the problem of legal reasoning in connection with issues of institutional design” 
(Bódig 2008: 15).11 The problem of formalism can be solved by establishing an institutional 
structure that allows both rule-based decision-making and principle-based reasoning to 
exist together in law. “If one accepts that the Constitution ultimately defi nes the scope and 
limits of all governmental authority at the federal level, then the legitimacy of the judiciary’s 
development and application of interpretive rules must be justifi ed by reference to the 
Constitution. To pursue any particular interpretive goal […] judges must be able to conclude 
either that the Constitution calls for (or at least inspires) the pursuit of those goals or that 
the federal courts themselves have inherent authority to adopt and apply such interpretive 
norms in the exercise of the judicial power.” (Manning 1999: 690–691.)
Within this theoretical framework, our task is to explore the real institutional function 
of adjudication. We have to answer the question of what is expected from judges in a 
constitutional democracy that is committed to the values and principles of democracy, the 
rule of law and the separation of powers. Here we also can mention several theoretical 
approaches that must be examined if we would like to make this issue clear. First, it is 
possible to unfold a theory which concentrates on the “rule-applying” function of judges. 
The essence of this theory can be the claim that the function and real task of judges is to 
apply and interpret what is written in fi xed legal rules (Dworkin 1985: 11). 
However, there are different approaches. Ronald Dworkin’s theory focuses not on the 
written rules, but on (moral) rights that citizens have in a political community. For him the 
task of the judge is to take rights seriously, because citizens do not only have those rights 
that are backed by fi xed rules. Our rights stem from the political morality of the community, 
and we can enforce them in courts even if they are not provided by fi xed legal rules. “The 
rights conception […] supposes that citizens have moral rights – that is, rights other than 
and prior to those given by positive enactment – so that a society can sensibly be criticized 
on the ground that its enactments do not recognize the rights people have.” (Dworkin 
1985: 13.)
A third theoretical approach can be explicated as well, according to which the essential 
role and function of judges is to do justice. This theory commits itself to the claim that the 
judge should not only apply fi xed legal rules, but should do justice when deciding cases. 
“The adjudication in each case must result not only from an application of a legal rule but, 
also, in what the judge feels to be a result that is as fair as possible to the individual interests 
concerned.” (Tate, 1975: 250.)
11 See Bódig, M.: Rules, Principles, and the Problem of the Limits of Legal Reasoning. op. cit. 
15.
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IV/e) Virtue jurisprudence
This thesis leads us to another theoretical approach to judging, which can be called virtue 
jurisprudence. According to this theory, the basis of judges’ decisions is justice, where just 
decisions are made possible by having practical wisdom. Within this theory judicial virtues 
are the most important requirements needed to be a good judge and make the right legal 
decisions. 
The most detailed explanation of the virtues of judges and a virtue centred theory of 
law is provided by Lawrence B. Solum. His theory implies the thesis that “judicial virtues 
are a necessary part of the best theory of judging” (Solum 2003: 184). 
The central claim of Professor Solum is that a virtue-centred theory of judging 
proceeds in a different way from the so-called decision-centred theories. The starting point 
of decision-centred theories is the criteria of right legal decisions. Their main task is to seek 
and work out the normative principles which make a legal decision justifi able, right or 
good. Only after this is achieved will they try to fi nd the judicial virtues that can contribute 
to making the right decision. Virtues are derived from the notion of the right decision. 
However, a virtue-centred theory follows another path because it claims that the fi rst step of 
theoretical analysis should concentrate on judicial virtues and then the criteria of justifi able 
decisions can be derived from these virtues (Solum 2003: 184).
Judicial virtues are part of human excellence in general. These virtues fall in the 
categories of theoretical wisdom, practical wisdom or are moral virtues. All of them are 
needed for a judge to make justifi able decisions. These virtues are judicial temperance, 
courage, temperament, intelligence, wisdom and the virtue of justice. Among these, the 
latter, wisdom of justice is the most important and central to the theory of judging. “If we 
know anything about judges, it is that they ought to be just.” or “[…] justice is an essential 
virtue for excellence in judging” (Solum 2003: 194). 
The wisdom of justice includes three important attitudes of a judge. First, she should 
be impartial. A good judge understands and takes the interests of every person involved in 
the confl ict into consideration and does not give priority to the interests of any of the 
participants. Second, a good judge has fi delity to law and can see the law as a coherent 
order. Fidelity to law manifests itself in judicial integrity, which means that the judge is 
unwilling to “improve” the law and reluctant to create uncertainty and inconsistency in law 
by ignoring the prescriptions of rules and legal standards. The third element of the virtue of 
justice is a sense of the situation at hand, a “legal vision, the ability to size up a case and 
discern which aspects are legally important. This requires an intellectual grasp of the 
content of the law, an understanding of the underlying purposes the law serves, and an 
ability to pick out the features of particular cases that are important for those rules and 
purposes.” (Solum 2003: 197.) It is not possible that only one or two of these elements of 
the wisdom of justice contribute(s) to the right decision. All these parts must be present in 
the judge’s personality as a “coherent” structure of virtues to make just and right legal 
decisions.
Virtue jurisprudence is relevant in the analysis of formalism because it has a relatively 
clear answer to the question of when formalist decisions are justifi able and when they 
are not.
The following part of Professor Solum’s theory throws light on the problem of 
formalism. He distinguishes between two kinds of cases. One type of legal cases can be 
called “justice as lawfulness”. In such cases the decision required by the legal rules is 
consistent with the judge’s sense of fairness. Very often, the outcome required by the plain 
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meaning (the letter) of laws is in accordance with justice. In every case, the judge must 
justify her decision and justice requires judges to explain their decisions on the basis of 
legal rules. This procedure requires the judge to have all the judicial virtues that were listed 
above: practical wisdom is needed to apply legal rules correctly (Solum 2003: 200–204).
The other type of cases is called “justice as fairness”. In this kind of case the outcome 
required by the legal rule is not in accordance with the judge’s sense of fairness. These 
cases give the opportunity for the judge to practice equity. Justice here requires judges to 
depart from the rule’s prescription. Where the rule leads to an unjust decision, the task of 
the judge is to make exceptions from the rule or to correct the defects of law, that is, to take 
the particular circumstances of the case into consideration and depart from the rule in 
accordance with the requirements of equity. This cannot be achieved correctly by relying on 
the judge’s own preferences. The practice of equity must be based on judicial virtues. Only 
a virtuous judge is able to decide whether it is justifi ed to depart from the rule, or not. Only 
a judge with a virtuous personality is able to decide on the principles of equity (Solum 
2003: 204–207). 
 “There are cases in which the just outcome can only be recognised by a virtuous 
judge.” (Solum 2003: 199.) So, a virtue-centred theory concentrates on judicial virtues as 
the fundamental grounds of just and right decisions. Thus, a virtue-centred theory can be a 
“candidate” which provides a theoretical basis for the problem of formalism. A judge who 
has theoretical and practical wisdom, judicial courage and temperance, and is able to decide 
according to the requirements of the wisdom of justice, will always decide cases in the right 
way. A virtuous judge will always know when it is justifi ed to depart from the clear meaning 
of the rule and when it is not.
However, one question remains to be answered. Judges are human beings, and not all 
of them have all the kinds of virtues that are required. Human beings are not perfect and 
even a virtuous judge can make wrong decisions. The question of formalism can be 
approached in a way that makes clear this imperfect character of human beings. Some 
formalists could say that we should pay attention to the fact that judges are human beings, 
have different capabilities and different virtues, and that is the reason why it should not be 
their task to decide whether departing from the clear meaning of the rule is justifi ed or not. 
Insisting on the rule’s prescription can contribute to fewer judicial failures and mistakes and 
imposes the responsibility for mistaken or unjust legal decisions on the legislator.
V. SUMMARY
My central case was that formalism is a theory of adjudication, it concerns the question of 
how judges should decide legal cases. However, my point is that the problem of formalism 
cannot be solved only within the framework of a theory of adjudication or legal reasoning 
because it can be connected to other issues that have to be analysed if our aim is to 
understand the nature and limits of formalism. The problem of formalism raises the 
theoretical issues of the nature of law, the authoritative force of law, the functions of 
adjudication in a modern democratic political community and the institutional structure of 
modern constitutional democracies. Moreover, it seems, the theoretical considerations of 
virtue jurisprudence cannot be ignored either. 
The problem of formalism is about reconciliation. The reconciliation of the most 
important values that have to be realized by modern legal systems. For example the values 
of stability, certainty and predictability, which are important requirements of the rule of law, 
confl ict with other important values of a legal system (justice, rationality, fairness, etc.). 
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The task of the theoretical analysis of formalism is to try to fi nd the best way to reconcile 
these values and this task cannot be realized only within a theory of legal reasoning and 
interpretation. When there is tension between these values, the question of how a judge 
should decide a case cannot be answered without having a conception of other issues. A 
wider theoretical analysis is needed that requires the theorist to explicate her conception 
about the nature of law, the authoritative force of law, the function of adjudication in a 
democratic society and the features of a virtuous judicial decision and fi nd the place of 
formalism in this coherent theoretical framework.
The main standpoint here is that law is an authoritative normative system and judges 
are obligated to decide according to the prescriptions of law. They have to justify their 
decisions by relying on the facts of cases and reasons that are parts of the law. Formalism 
concentrates on the question how judges should justify their decisions and how they should 
interpret source-based law to reach the legally correct and right answer. However, judging 
the merits of this normative theory of adjudication requires us to take into consideration the 
special circumstances of decision-making, reasoning and interpretation in the fi eld of law. 
When someone attempts to establish a correct theory about judicial decision-making, at 
least, the following factors should appear in the analysis. A normative theory of legal 
reasoning and interpretation should analyse the question of what kind of special practical 
guidance law provides and what kind of special obligation does it require from judges. This 
question can be explored by illuminating the concept of legal authority (Bódig 2007: 130). 
Formalism as a normative theory of adjudication cannot avoid elucidating this question, 
because law provides special reasons for action and decision, it has a special authoritative 
character. The theoretical implications of law’s claim to authority on how judges should 
decide legal cases cannot be ignored.
The other important factor that has implications on a normative theory of adjudication 
is the question of the persons who has to interpret the law (Bódig 2007: 130–131). Making 
legal decisions is the responsibility of special legal institutions, namely courts and judges. 
The theory of formalism, when it explicates its main theses, should pay attention to the 
special institutional and personal features of adjudication. It has to take into account of the 
institutional and constitutional design of a legal system, for instance it has to explain the 
function and role of judicial institutions in democratic political communities, moreover the 
personal capacities and virtues of judges also should be the part of its explanation about the 
correct method of legal reasoning and interpretation.  
My argument was that formalism is a necessary part of a legal system and adjudication. 
Committing ourselves to formalism sometimes entails that our decisions will not be just or 
fair or reasonable, all things considered. The justifi cation of this judicial attitude or strategy 
requires us to contemplate not just the functions of adjudication and the features of a 
virtuous judicial decision, but also requires us to reveal the complex theory of the nature 
and function of law, too. Namely, behind the theory of a formalist adjudication we need a 
theory about the nature and function of law that should be explicated.
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